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A striking but well known feature of the US labor market is that the average hourly wage of women is much lower than
that of men and that women face lower wage growth over the life cycle than men. A large empirical literature is aimed at
understanding the sources of gender difference in wages. Empirical studies typically ﬁnd that males earn higher wages
(even after controlling for gender differences in observed characteristics) and face higher returns to labor market experience
than females.1 One problem in interpreting these results is that we cannot assess to what extent they are driven by
(unobserved) investments in human capital. Economic theory suggests that this is a difﬁcult problem to deal with. Since the
return to human capital accumulation depends on future labor supply, theory implies that investments should be driven by
expected labor supply (rather than by past labor supply). While economic theory prescribes that investment decisions are
forward looking, obvious data limitations make it hard to incorporate labor supply expectations into the empirical analysis.
In the present paper, we use quantitative theory to assess the importance of (unmeasured) human capital investments in
understanding gender differences in wage growth over the life cycle. In our theory, individuals decide how much (unob
served) effort to spend in accumulating on the job human capital and whether to work or stay at home. We assume that
females also make fertility decisions. Clearly, any theory of gender differences needs to introduce some differences between
males and females. While there are many ways one could introduce gender differences, our approach is to assume that the
bearing and presence of children involves a forced reduction in hours of work that falls on females rather than on males andosa), lfuster@eco.uc3m.es (L. Fuster), diegorestuccia@gmail.com (D. Restuccia).
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that there is an exogenous gender gap in hours of work. We assume that there are no gender differences in the human
capital technology and calibrate this technology using wage age proﬁles of men. The model is calibrated to the fertility
patterns and to the impact of children on career interruptions and labor supply of women in the data. The quantitative
theory is then used to measure human capital accumulation of females during the life cycle and to compare it with that of
males.2
The starting point of our analysis is that there are substantial gender differences in labor supply in the United States.
Using data from the NLSY(1979) we build detailed labor market histories of men and women and add up weekly hours of
work over the life cycle. We ﬁnd that by age 40 the gender differences in cumulative hours of work are 45% among non
college individuals and 27% among college individuals (notice that gender differences in cumulative hours of work are much
larger than the ones obtained by focusing on years of employment, which is the measure of experience typically used in
empirical studies).3 We also document that children have an important role in generating gender differences in labor supply
by comparing labor market histories of mothers and non mothers.4 Human capital theory implies that gender differences in
hours of work should translate into different incentives for human capital accumulation across genders. Furthermore, the
data lends supports to the importance of human capital investments as determinants of wages since there is substantial
wage growth during the ﬁrst 20 years of labor market experience wages of men more than double between age 20 and age
40. Moreover, the data suggests that differential investments in human capital can be large since over the ﬁrst 20 years of
labor market experience men's wages grow one percentage point higher per year than women's wages.
Our quantitative theory is built to match the males' age employment proﬁle and the age proﬁle of hours of work for
college and non college individuals. Regarding females, the theory replicates the birth rates by age and the impact of
children on career interruptions and labor supply for college and non college females. We ﬁnd that gender differences in
employment and hours lead to differential returns to experience across genders and a wage gap that increases with age. We
ﬁnd that the gender wage gap grows over the life cycle by 25 percentage points for non college individuals and by 22
percentage points for college individuals. Altogether, the model accounts for all of the increase in the gender wage gap over
the life cycle in the NLSY data for college individuals and slightly over predicts the increase in the gender wage gap for non
college individuals. We also ﬁnd that the impact of children on the labor supply of females accounts for 56% of the increase
in the gender gap in wages over the life cycle of non college females, and for about 45% of the increase in the gender wage
gap among college females, while the rest is due to exogenous gender differences in hours of work. Children have a large
negative effect on wages of females because they reduce labor supply at a stage of the life cycle when the returns to human
capital accumulation on the job are high.
Our ﬁndings are consistent with the vast empirical literature that ﬁnds a substantial gender residual in wage regressions
that measure human capital investments by past experience. To illustrate this point, we simulate non college educated
males and females in our model that are identical in terms of initial human capital and lifetime employment. Our simulated
males and females only differ in lifetime labor supply because females work 10% less hours than males and because females
expect to have children with the associated negative impact on labor supply even though ex post no female is ever given
an opportunity to have children. Since females in this experiment work more than 35 hours a week, we follow the empirical
literature in counting them as full time employed. Hence, the data generated by this experiment features no gender dif
ferences in experience as measured by full time employment. Nevertheless, we ﬁnd a gender wage ratio of 0.875 at age 40.
Using the simulated data, a standard wage regression of log wages on experience (measured as full time employment) and a
sex dummy as explanatory variables, would attribute a negative wage effect to being a female worker and a lower return to
(measured) experience by females relative to males. We conclude that, in the context of our model, standard measures of
experience typically used in the empirical literature are not good measures of investment in human capital over the
life cycle.
Our paper is motivated by some basic insights from human capital theory. The theories developed by Becker (1967) and
Ben Porath (1967) stress the importance of modeling human capital and labor supply decisions jointly in a life cycle fra
mework. Two crucial insights from these seminal papers are that the incentives to accumulate human capital vary along the
life cycle and that these incentives are directly proportional to the time one expects to work over the lifetime. The idea that
women may face different incentives to accumulate human capital than men due to a higher relative value of non market
activities can be traced back to the inﬂuential work of Mincer and Polachek (1974).5 These authors provide evidence that
married women tend to interrupt their labor market attachment with periods of non participation and, using a regression2 Our model assumes that women start their life cycle with the same human capital as males (at 17 years of age for non-college and 23 years of age for
college women). Hence, our theory abstracts from the initial gender wage gap of about 10% in the data. However, we emphasize that by age 40 the bulk of
the gender wage gap (about 70%) is explained by gender differences in wage growth over the life cycle. Moreover, note that the forces that imply low
employment and hours of work by females with young children in our model would also induce females to supply less hours of work and less effort in
accumulating human capital before the initial age in our model economy.
3 An advantage of the NLSY, relative to other data sources such as CPS or PSID, is that it provides week by week data on hours of work. This is important
because we ﬁnd large gender differences in working hours, even among full-time workers.
4 Because the negative association between children and female labor supply could be an artifact of selection, we provide evidence that – conditional
on education – mothers are not self-selected from females with low labor market attachment. For details, see discussion of children and labor market
outcomes in Section 2.
5 Gronau (1988) and Weiss and Gronau (1981) are also important early contributions studying how labor market interruptions affect women's
investment in human capital.
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framework, they ﬁnd that expected career interruptions do have an impact on the human capital investments of young
women. While intuitively appealing, the insights of Mincer and Polachek have not been formally modeled in a decision
theoretic framework. In fact, Killingsworth and Heckman (1987) in their survey on female labor supply refer to the work of
Mincer and Polachek as the “informal theory”. One way of viewing our contribution is to provide an explicit model of the
“informal theory” and to evaluate its quantitative importance for understanding the wages and the labor supply of women
over the life cycle.
Our paper follows a research line in quantitative theory on the economics of the family initiated by Aiyagari et al. (2000)
and Regalia and Ríos Rull (1998). It is related to a recent macroeconomic literature that studies change in female labor
supply over time; see Attanasio et al. (2008), Buttet and Schoonbrodt (2013), Cardia and Gomme (2013), Da Rocha and
Fuster (2006), Domeij and Klein (2013), Greenwood and Guner (2009), Greenwood et al. (2005), Jones et al. (2003), Knowles
(2009, 2013), and Olivetti (2006). Guner et al. (2012) analyze how taxation affects labor force participation of women and
the returns to experience faced by females. Our paper follows Huggett et al. (2006, 2011) in using panel data on males to
restrict the human capital technology in a life cycle model. Our paper differs from theirs in that we focus on gender dif
ferences in wages. Bowlus (1997) estimates a search model in order to assess the role of gender differences in expected labor
market turnover for understanding the gender wage gap, an exercise that is similar in spirit to ours. Our decision theoretic
framework does not model the demand side of the labor market, which can also be a source of gender differences in wages.
Albanesi and Olivetti (2009) show that, in the presence of private information on worker's labor market attachment, ﬁrms
may use gender as a screening device and pay different wages to male and female workers.
Our paper also relates to the literature on wage differences between mothers and non mothers (see for instance
Anderson et al., 2002; Skirbekk, 2003). Empirical studies in this literature emphasize the importance of children on work
interruptions of women through destruction of ﬁrm speciﬁc skills and good quality job matches. Erosa et al. (2002, 2010)
argue that these features can account for only about 10 20% of the family gap in wages. Differently than the large wage
losses associated with layoffs, the negative impact of career interruptions due to childbirth on wages is limited by the
endogeneity of career interruption decisions. Instead, in our model the family gap in wages arises because children generate
career interruptions at a stage of the life cycle when substantial investment in human capital occurs.
The paper is organized as follows. In the next section, we discuss the main features of the NLSY79 data for men and
women that motivate our analysis. In Section 3, we describe the economic environment and in Section 4, we discuss the
calibration. In Section 5, we present the main quantitative results and in the last section we conclude.Fig. 1. Average hourly wage by age. Relative to the average wage of men at age 20.
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Table 1
Average hours and employment.
Hours and employment Non-collegea Collegeb
Men Women Men Women
All No childc All No child
Hours per person (week) 36.2 24.7 32.8 41.6 31.2 36.7
Hours per worker (week) 44.2 36.9 40.5 46.2 39.0 42.7
Employment to population ratio 0.82 0.67 0.81 0.82 0.67 0.81
a People 20–43 years of age.
b People 23–43 years of age.
c No child refers to women with no children (until the last observation in our sample, when women are 36–43 years old).2. Data
We use a panel data from the National Longitudinal Survey of Youth (NLSY79) to document observations characterizing
the behavior of a recent cohort of young men and women in the labor market. We emphasize three observations from these
data. First, gender differences in wages grow substantially over the life cycle. Second, on average men work much more over
the early part of the life cycle than women. Third, the origin of the gender differences in labor supply can be traced to the
impact of children in labor market decisions of women. In what follows we document these observations in detail.
Description of the data: The NLSY79 is a panel data of a cohort of individuals that in 1979, the time of the ﬁrst interview,
were between 14 and 21 years of age. The NLSY79 documents labor market histories of people for every week in the sample,
allowing us to study the impact of children on labor market decisions of women. We divide our sample in two educational
groups and we refer to them as non college and college. We deﬁne college individuals as those who attain 16 years of
education or more and we exclude from the sample individuals with more than 20 years of education. In our data the
fraction of college individuals in the population is the same for men and women and it is about 25%.
Gender differences in wages: A salient feature of the labor market is that the average hourly wage of women is sub
stantially lower than the average wage of men. In our sample of the NLSY79, the average wage ratio between women and
men is 0.78. Although wages grow substantially over the life cycle for both men and women, the gender wage ratio
decreases over the life cycle the gender gap in wages increases with age. The increase in the average wage over the life
cycle for men and women for both educational types is shown in Fig. 1. Whereas the average wage of non college indivi
duals increases between age 17 and age 40 by a factor of 2.45 for men, it increases by a factor of 1.95 for women. The gender
difference in wage growth for non college individuals is on average about 1 percentage point per year and accounts for an
increase in the gender wage gap between ages 17 and 40 of about 20 percentage points. For people with college education,
the average wage between age 23 and age 40 increases by a factor of 2.28 and 1.77 for men and women, respectively. These
observations imply a gender difference in wage growth of 1.3 percentage points per year and an increase in the gender gap
between ages 23 and 40 of 20 percentage points. Altogether, the fact that men more than double their wages in a 20 year
period suggests that there are important human capital investments over the life cycle. Human capital theory suggests that
the returns to human capital investments depend on how much hours people expect to work in the future. If men and
women differ with respect to their actual or expected attachment to the labor market, their incentives to invest in human
capital would differ as well. Hence, human capital theory suggests that it is important to evaluate the extent of gender
differences in labor supply in the data.
Employment and hours: On average non college men work 46% more hours than non college women (36.2 vs. 24.7 h per
person per week, see Table 1). About 50% of this gender difference in hours of work is accounted for by the gender difference
in hours per worker (intensive margin) while the remaining part is accounted for by the gender difference in the
employment to population ratio (extensive margin).6 We also ﬁnd substantial gender differences in labor supply among
college individuals. College men work 33% more hours than college women, with gender difference in hours per worker
accounting for 60% of the total difference in hours of work.
Figs. 2 and 3 document the life cycle path of average hours per worker and the employment to population ratio for men
and women for both educational types. Among non college, hours per worker and the employment to population ratio
increase with age for both men and women, but employment is more prevalent for men than for women at every age group.
While the employment to population ratio is about 7 percentage points higher for men than for women at age 17, by age 40
this difference is 13 percentage points. There is also a substantial gap in hours of work among people working: At age 17,6 Hours per person can be decomposed into hours per worker and the employment to population ratio:
H
P
H
W
W
P
þ0  1W
P
 
;
where H is aggregate labor hours, P is the working-age population, and W is the number of people employed. On average, men work 40% more hours than
women, while among those working, men work almost 20% more hours than women.
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Fig. 2. Employment to population ratio. Women NoKever refers to women with no children (until the last observation in our sample, when women are
between 36 and 43 years of age).employed men spend 4 h more working per week than women. At age 40 the difference in hours of work is 9 h per week.
Similarly, we ﬁnd that the gender differences in hours worked and employment rate expand over the life cycle for college
educated individuals. Interestingly, we ﬁnd that the employment rate and hours per worker of college educated women
decrease with age during the child rearing period.
Children and labor market outcomes: Labor supply differences across gender are substantial. What is striking in comparing
labor market outcomes of men and women is the role that children play in labor supply decisions of women. We compare
statistics for the average of all women and for the average of women who never had children.7 For the non college type, the
employment to population ratio of women with no children is almost identical to that of men during the life cycle as
documented in Fig. 2. The pattern of average hours per worker is also similar between non college men and women with no
children except for a constant gap (roughly 5 h per worker per week or about 10% of the hours per worker of males) (see
Fig. 3). Among the college educated, we also observe that women with no children work more often and more hours than
the average women.8
The fact that there is a negative association between children and female labor supply in the data does not necessarily
imply that children have a negative effect on female labor supply as this empirical relationship could well be due to
selection: women can be heterogeneous in their labor market attachment and mothers could be drawn from workers with
low preferences for work. To address this concern, we discuss data suggesting that children have a negative impact on
female labor supply. A ﬁrst clue of the role of children is in Fig. 2: gender differences in labor supply grow substantially at
the ages when women start bearing children. While for non college individuals the gender differences in employment rates
grow substantially after age 23 and start diminishing rapidly before age 30, for college individuals the employment rate only
differs across genders after age 26 and these differences are still substantial by age 40. These patterns are consistent with the
fact that college educated women tend to give birth at older ages than less educated females and with the view that children
of young age negatively affect the labor supply of mothers. Table 2 documents that the employment rates between
mothers and non mothers differ substantially, particularly when children are young. While women with no children have
an average employment to population ratio similar to the average of men (81% vs. 82% for non college and 86% vs. 90% for
college), women with at least one child under 6 years of age have employment to population ratios below 60% in the case of
non college individuals and below 73% in the case of college women. The employment ratio of women with young children7 For the last observation of every woman in our sample – when they are between 36 and 43 years of age – we consider women who had not had
children up to that point and we refer to them as women with no children (Women NoKever in the graphs).
8 Interestingly, while non-college women with no children work as often as men, the employment rate of college women with no children is lower
than the one of the men (see Fig. 2). A possible explanation for the different behavior of women with no children across educational types is that college
women marry wealthier men than non-college women.
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Fig. 3. Hours per-worker (per-week). Women NoKever refers to women with no children (until the last observation in our sample, when women are
between 36 and 43 years of age).
Table 2
Average hours and employment.
Hours and employment Non-college College
H./P. H./W. Emp. H./P. H./W. Emp.
Men 36.2 44.2 82.0 41.6 46.2 90.0
Women 24.7 36.9 67.0 31.2 39.0 80.0
Women without children 32.8 40.5 81.0 36.7 42.7 86.0
Women by number of children under 6:
1 20.7 36.6 56.7 25.8 35.7 72.4
2 14.9 34.8 42.9 19.8 33.0 60.0
3 or more 10.6 34.1 31.0 14.7 32.2 45.8
Women by age of youngest child:
Less than 3 months 10.2 35.5 28.7 16.7 34.8 48.2
3–6 months 14.0 34.8 40.0 19.7 34.2 57.8
6–9 months 15.1 34.6 43.8 20.7 33.9 61.1
9–12 months 15.7 34.8 45.2 21.1 33.9 62.4
1–5 years 19.4 36.1 53.8 24.0 34.8 69.0
5–6 years 23.7 37.4 63.5 27.7 36.1 75.7(less than a year old) is lower than 45% in the case of non college and 62% in the case of college. The fact that the
employment rate of mothers grows substantially with the age of their youngest children suggests that the low employment
rate of mothers is not due to permanent differences in the labor market attachment between mothers and non mothers.
More direct evidence on the importance of children in generating gender differences in labor supply can be obtained by
exploiting the panel dimension of our NLSY data. We do this in three ways. First, we show that the duration of non
employment spells differs substantially across genders and that children play a crucial role in accounting for these obser
vations. We divide all non employment spells of women between spells that involve the birth of one child at the time or
during the job separation (we call these spells “birth”) and spells that do not involve the birth of a child (“No birth”).9 An
important fraction of all non employment spells do not involve the birth of a child (almost 82%) and the average duration of9 The NLSY79 provides the necessary information to characterize labor market decisions of women around the birth of a child (6 weeks or less either
before or after birth). We restrict our sample to include histories of people that at the start of any spell are 20 years of age or older and we abstract from
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Table 3
Duration of non-employment spells.
Duration Non-college College
Men Women Women Men Women Women
No birth Birth No birth Birth
Average (weeks) 45.6 73.8 50.4 113.4 41.6 60 38 102
Distribution (%):
1 quarter (7–19) 46 37 42 19 49 52 57 30
2 quarters (20–32) 19 16 18 10 18 12 13 11
3 quarters (33–45) 11 10 11 9 11 9 10 9
4 quarters (46–58) 6 7 7 8 7 5 6 5
More than a year ð458Þ 18 30 22 54 15 22 14 45
Fig. 4. Employment rate around birth.these spells is similar to that of men (46 weeks for men vs. 50 weeks for women in the case of non college and 42 weeks for
men vs. 38 weeks for women in the case of college). Table 3 documents that the main difference in the duration of non
employment spells between men and women is in the spells of women that involve the birth of a child (46 weeks for men
vs. 113 weeks for women in the case of non college group and 42 weeks for men vs. 102 weeks for women in the case of the
college category). As documented below, the gender differences in the duration of non employment spells translate into
important differences in accumulated labor market experience.
Second, to document that children have a direct causal effect on female labor supply, we examine labor market decisions
of mothers before and after childbirth for all birth episodes in the NLSY. Fig. 4 shows that the employment rate decreases
during pregnancy and that it slowly recovers after childbirth. For both education groups, the employment rate one year after
birth is still more than 10 percentage points below its level prior to pregnancy. Third, we provide evidence that conditional
on education mothers do not differ from non mothers in terms of their attachment to the labor market. This is important
for the following reason: while our quantitative theory allows for differences in fertility and human capital accumulation
across women of different education groups, our ﬁndings may exaggerate the role of children if, after controlling for
education, there are important differences in labor market attachment across mother and non mothers in the NLSY data.10
To evaluate this possibility, we partition the population of women in the NLSY in two groups: the ﬁrst group is comprised by
the women who have not become mothers by the last NLSY interview. We refer to this group as women with no kids ever
(women NKE). The second group includes women who have become mothers at some point. Fig. 5 compares the(footnote continued)
spells of short duration (6 weeks or less). Childbirth refers to non-employment spells that involve the birth of a child at the start or during the spell. About
82% of all non-employment spells involve “no childbirth” for women, 15% involve the birth of one child and 3% involve the birth of two or more children.
10 While individuals might also differ in terms of cognitive ability, Cawley et al. (2001) argue that measures of cognitive ability and schooling are so
strongly correlated that one cannot separate their effects on labor market outcomes without imposing arbitrary parametric structures in estimation which,
when tested, are rejected by the data.
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Fig. 5. Employment rate.
Fig. 6. Hours per week.employment rate of women with no kids ever with the employment rate of mothers 1 year before they had their ﬁrst child.
The ﬁgure reveals that mothers, prior to giving birth to the ﬁrst child, do not appear to have lower employment rates than8
Table 4
Accumulated experience at age 40 (years).
Experience Non-college College
Weeks Hoursa Weeks Hoursa
Men (M) 18.7 21.0 19.3 20.9
Women (W) 15.3 14.4 17.6 16.4
Ratio M/W 1.22 1.45 1.10 1.27
Women:
No Children 16.6 16.7 18.5 18.6
Children 14.8 13.7 17.3 15.7
a Refers to equivalent years corresponding to 52 weeks and 40 h of work per week.womenwith no kids ever. Fig. 6 shows that average working hours, conditional on employment, are quite similar for women
with no kids ever and for mothers one year before they gave birth to their ﬁrst child. Altogether, the evidence in Figs 5 and 6
suggest that there are no differences in labor market attachment between mothers, prior to giving birth to their ﬁrst child,
and women with no kids ever. We interpret this evidence as suggesting that mothers are not self selected from a group of
women with low labor market attachment. This interpretation is consistent with the ﬁndings of Light and Ureta (1995).
These authors use data from the National Longitudinal Survey to estimate proportional hazard models of career interrup
tions that allow for the presence of unobserved heterogeneity. While their estimates imply considerable unobserved het
erogeneity among women for early cohorts in their study, they conclude that for women born after 1950 unobserved
heterogeneity becomes an insigniﬁcant factor and that the only important determinant of women's turnover is the presence
of young children (see Light and Ureta, 1995, p. 179).
The accumulation of experience: Women are characterized by lower employment, fewer hours of work, and longer
duration of non employment spells than men. These gender differences in labor supply imply that on average, women
accumulate less experience in the labor market than men. Table 4 documents the average accumulated experience for men
and women at age 40 in our panel data, for two measures of experience: accumulated weeks of work and accumulated
weekly hours of work.11 Table 4 indicates that by age 40, non college men have accumulated 22% more weeks of experience
than non college women, and 45% more hours of work than non college women. The gender differences in labor market
experience are lower but still substantial for the college type (see Table 4). Women with children accumulate much less
experience (measured in hours) than men, 53% less in the case of non college women and 33% less in the case of college
women. We emphasize that the gender differences in experience that we obtain by adding up hours of work over the life
cycle in Table 4 are much larger than the ones implied by commonly used measures of experience such as potential
experience (age years of schooling 6) or actual experience (accumulated years of employment). We conclude that the large
gender differences in cumulative hours of work suggest that women face much lower incentives to accumulate human
capital than men.3. Economic environment
We consider a life cycle economy populated by male and female workers. In each period people decide whether to work
or stay at home and, if they work, they choose an amount of effort in accumulating human capital. Females also make
fertility decisions. We assume that the population is divided in two (exogenous) education groups representing college and
non college individuals. While preferences, human capital accumulation technology, and shocks are assumed to vary across
education types, we do not index parameters and variables with an education index to keep the notation as simple as
possible. To keep our analysis simple, we abstract from marriage, inter temporal consumption smoothing, and general
equilibrium interactions.12 Below we present the key ingredients of our framework.
Life cycle: We assume that individuals of the two education types retire from the labor market at age 65. Modeling a
ﬁnite lifetime allow us to capture the life cycle aspect of fertility and human capital accumulation decisions. Moreover, the
model generates life cycle observations for employment and wages that can be compared with data.
Labor decision: We model the labor participation decision by assuming that people draw a stochastic value of staying at
home, which could be correlated over time and vary with age and, in the case of females, with the number of children.
People decide whether to work a ﬁxed amount of hours (that depends on the age, gender, education, and number of
children of that person) or not to work. In making the employment decision, people face the following trade off: if they11 There are some cases of people that are employed but report either zero hours or there are no hours reported. The numbers presented in Table 4
assume that these cases as zero hours, but alternative assumptions yield similar results.
12 Our theory can accommodate marriage by assuming that matching is independent of fertility, labor market, and human capital decisions. Extending
the theory to model non-trivial joint decisions by husbands and wives is a daunting task since we would need to model three endogenous state variables
(asset accumulation and human capital of husbands and wives) together with discrete (non-convex) labor-participation and fertility decisions.
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A. Erosa et al. / European Economic Review 85 (2016) 165–187174work, they earn labor earnings, which enter linearly in their utility function but they do not enjoy the entire utility of staying
at home. The trade off also has a dynamic component since we assume that human capital is accumulated while working.
Human capital accumulation decision: We model human capital accumulation while working. The technology to accu
mulate human capital varies across education groups. We assume that workers who exert effort e increase their human
capital by a proportion Δ with probability e. The utility cost of effort is given by cðj;hÞlogð1 eÞ, where cðj;hÞ is a function of
the age and human capital of the person. Roughly speaking, the parameter values describing the utility cost of effort cðj;hÞ
are selected to match age and experience proﬁle of wages for people at different points of the wage distribution for each
education type. Studies in the psychology literature point that the ability to learn decreases with age, suggesting that the
cost of accumulating human capital increases with age.13 We also allow for the possibility that spending time at home is
more valuable for high human capital people. Finally, we assume that the wage rate is proportional to human capital.
Fertility decision: We assume that females derive utility from children and from spending time with them at home.
Therefore, children can have a negative impact on the employment decision of females. In addition, we assume that children
reduce the hours of work of females by an exogenous amount per child. We assume that females need a fertility opportunity
in order to consider the decision of having a newborn child. Fertility opportunities arise stochastically over time and their
likelihood varies with age and the number of children. We introduce fertility opportunities in the model in order to capture
time frictions such as ﬁnding a partner and biological constraints. Moreover, this assumption allows our model to generate a
reasonable age proﬁle of fertility for each education group.
Timing of decisions: Below, we draw a time line representing the timing of decisions within a period in our model for an
individual in an exogenously given education group. People start an age j period with a state given by the value of staying at
home v and an amount of human capital h. In addition, females start the period with a given number of children n and a
fertility shock. In a ﬁrst stage, females who have a fertility opportunity decide whether to give birth or not. Males and
females without fertility opportunities do not make any decisions in this stage. In a second stage, people decide whether to
work a ﬁxed amount of hours (that depends on the age, gender, and number of children of the person) or not to work. In a
third stage, working individuals decide how much effort to exert in accumulating human capital. People who do not work
during the current period enjoy the value of staying at home. At the end of the period, individuals make a new draw for the
value of staying at home (which is assumed to be correlated over time).We formalize the decision problem of a female using the language of dynamic programming. The decision problem of a male
is similar but without the fertility stage. An age j female starts the period with a state given by human capital h, number of
children n, and home value v. She then faces a fertility opportunity with probability θjðnÞ: Her value function, prior to the
realization of the fertility opportunity, is represented by Bjðh;n; vÞ and satisﬁes,
Bjðh;n; vÞ ¼ θjðnÞmax Vjðh;nþ1; vÞ;Vjðh;n; vÞ
n o
þð1 θjðnÞÞVjðh;n; vÞ;
where the max operator represents the fertility decision and Vj denotes the value function of a female after the fertility
stage. The labor market decision is represented as follows:
Vjðh;n; vÞ ¼max Wjðh;n; vÞ;Hjðh;n; vÞ
n o
;
where W denotes the value of working and H the value of staying at home. Wj is given by,
Wjðh;n; vÞ ¼ hlðj;nÞþð1 lðj;nÞÞuðh; vÞþγnlogð1þnÞþ max
eA ½0;1
cðj;hÞlogð1 eÞþeV^ jðhð1þΔÞ;n; vÞþð1 eÞV^ jðh;n; vÞ
n o
;
where lðj;nÞ denotes the fraction of hours worked by a female of age j and n children, hlðj;nÞ represents labor earnings, uðh; vÞ
is the value of staying at home which is allowed to depend on human capital and the value of staying at home v, and γn is a
parameter determining females’ taste for children. If the worker exerts effort e, at a utility cost of cðj;hÞlogð1 eÞ; the worker
increases human capital to hð1þΔÞ with probability e. The function V^ j is the expected discounted value of a female prior to
the realization of the value of staying at home next period. This value evolves over time according to a transition function Qj13 See for instance Avolio and Waldman (1994) and Skirbekk (2003).
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Table 5
Calibration for males.
Parameter Target
vj Employment by age
ρ Duration of non-employment spells
σϵs Average experience at age 40
σh0 C.V. wage at age 17 for non-college and age 23 for college
ðα1 ;α2;Δ; γhÞ Wage–age proﬁles
for high and low wage people(which depends on the age of the worker),
V^
jðh0;n; vÞ ¼ β
Z
v0
Bjþ1ðh0;n; v0ÞQjðdv0; vÞ:
The value of not working H is given by,
Hjðh;n; vÞ ¼ uðh; vÞþγnlogð1þnÞþβ
Z
v0
Bjþ1ðh;n; v0ÞQjðdv0; vÞ:
People who do not work enjoy the entire value of staying at home uðh; vÞ.4. Calibration
Our calibration strategy is as follows. For each educational type, we calibrate the model to panel data of men, in par
ticular, we target the employment ratio and hours of work by age, the accumulation of experience, the duration distribution
of non employment spells, and the growth in wages over the life cycle. We emphasize that heterogeneity and the life cycle
wage proﬁle are important for setting the parameter that determine the technology of human capital accumulation. For
females, we only calibrate to targets that relate to the number of children and to the employment and hours histories of
women after childbirth for each education group. We model the decisions of non college individuals from age 17 on since
women between ages 17 and 19 account for 20% of all the births among women in this education group. College individuals
are modeled from age 20 on. The mapping between parameter values and targets in the data is multidimensional and we
thus solve for parameter values jointly. For expositional reasons, we next describe the role of each parameter on a speciﬁc
target as if the parameter had a ﬁrst order impact in the target. In the appendix, we report the calibrated parameter values
for non college and college individuals (see Table 18).
4.1. Calibration of males
Some parameters are selected without solving the model. We set the model period to be a quarter and β¼ 0:99. Hours
per worker for males, lðjÞ, younger than 41 years of age are obtained from NLSY79 and for men 41 64 years of age, hours are
obtained from CPS data. Since investment in human capital in our theory is determined by future (life cycle) labor supply,
we emphasize the importance of obtaining reasonable age proﬁle of hours of work and employment. Another set of
parameter values is selected to match certain targets in the data by solving the model. We describe this procedure in detail
below. We present a summary of parameters and targets in Table 5.
Value of staying at home: We assume that the value of staying at home for a worker with human capital h and home shock
v is given by uðh; vÞ ¼ hv. We assume that v¼ vjvs, where vj represents a deterministic life cycle value of staying at home and
vs denotes a stochastic shock to the value of staying at home which is independent across individuals. The life cycle term vj
is used to generate a plausible age proﬁle of employment. We search for 9 values of vj in order to match the employment
rate of men at 9 selected ages (the values of vj for other ages are linearly interpolated). The stochastic component vs is used
to generate ﬂows in and out of employment. We assume that vs follows a ﬁrst order autoregressive process: vs0 ¼ ρvsþεv,
where εv Nð0; σ2v Þ. The parameters ðρ; σvÞ are selected in order to match the duration distribution of non employment spells
and the mean years of job market experience of male workers at age 40.
Human capital: We assume that when individuals enter the labor market, they make a draw of their initial human capital
from a log normal distribution. We ﬁrst discuss the calibration of the human capital technology for the non college group.
The mean of log human capital is normalized to 2 (the lowest log human capital is normalized to 0) and the standard
deviation, σh0 , is chosen so that the coefﬁcient of variation of wages for male workers of age 17 matches the 0.36 value in the
NLSY79 data for non college individuals. We assume that the disutility of effort varies with age and human capital according
to the function cðj;hÞ ¼ αðjÞhγh where αðjÞ ¼ α1þ jα2 and γh40. The technology for accumulating human capital is then
described by the growth rate Δ, γh, and the parameters ðα1; α2Þ. These parameters are selected in order to obtain the age
proﬁle of wages for two groups of non college workers in the data. In particular, we focus on the average wage for people at11
Table 6
Calibration for females.
Parameter Target
θjðnÞ Distribution of number of children
γn Total fertility rate
μvc Employment of mothers of a child younger than 1 year of age
Table 7
Fixed effects panel regression: hours worked by women.
Regressor Non-college College
Age 3.32 16.09
(0.476) (0.78)
Age2 0.086 0.44
(0.015) (0.025)
Age3 0.0007 0.0039
(0.0001) (0.0002)
Children 6.81 12.56
(0.33) (0.757)
Agechildren 0.133 0.239
(0.009) (0.020)
Intercept 0.196 147.8
(4.82) (8.01)the bottom and at the top 50% of the distribution of wages at each age. The calibration for college individuals is done
similarly but targeting data on wages after age 23.14
Summarizing: We divide the set of calibrated parameters in two groups. The ﬁrst group consists of those parameters that
can be selected without solving the model. They include the time discount rate and the proﬁle of working hours by age. The
second group consists of 16 parameters whose calibration requires solving the model. They are given by 9 parameters
describing deterministic home values by age ðvjÞ, 2 parameters describing the stochastic home values ðρ; σϵÞ, 4 parameters
describing the technology of human capital accumulation ðΔ; α1; α2; γhÞ, and 1 parameter for the initial distribution of human
capital σh0 . We proceed by minimizing a loss function which adds the square deviations between the values of the statistics
in the model and the values of the target statistics in the data. A summary of the parameter values obtained is shown in the
Appendix in Table 18.
4.2. Calibration for females
Preference for children and fertility opportunities: For each educational type, we select the preference parameter for the
number of children γn to match the total fertility rate in the NLSY79 data. We assume that fertility opportunities are constant
within four age groups but differ by number of children (0, 1, 2, and 3 or more).15 We parameterize fertility opportunities
with 7 parameters: 4 parameters describing fertility opportunities for the ﬁrst child and 3 parameters scaling fertility
opportunities by age conditional on having one, two, and three or more children. These parameters are chosen to match
birth rates by age and the distribution of females at age 40 by the number of children. A summary of the parameters and the
targets in the data is reported in Table 6. The parameter values obtained in the calibration are reported in the Appendix.
Value of staying at home: In order to model the impact of children on female employment and career interruptions, we
assume that females derive utility from spending time at home with children. The value of staying at home for females is
given by v¼ vjðvsþvcÞ. The term vj represents a life cycle (deterministic) value and vs is a stochastic value of staying at home
as described in the calibration for males. The term vc is a stochastic value of spending time at home with children. We
assume that females can enjoy vc when giving birth or during a child related spell of non employment. In other words,
working females that have not given birth in the current period cannot quit their jobs to enjoy vc. For computational
simplicity, we assume that vc is drawn from an exponential distribution with mean μvc . For each educational type, the
parameter μvc is selected to match the employment ratio of womenwho are mothers of a child younger than one year of age.
Hours of work and human capital: We assume that the age proﬁle of working hours for females is the same as the one for
males but for the fact that females work on average 10% less hours than males (at every age). We assume that the presence
of children reduces the hours worked of mothers until they reach age 40 and that the reduction in hours depends on the age14 In this way we achieve a compromise between targeting wage growth over a long period of time and ensuring that the wage data comes from
individuals that have completed schooling or are close to ﬁnish their college education.
15 The four age groups are 17–21, 22–26, 27–31, and 32–40 for the calibration of non-college women and 20–24, 25–29, 30–34, and 35–40 for the
calibration of college women.
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Fig. 7. Employment ratio by age – males.
Table 8
Distribution of accumulated experience (weeks) – males.
Experience Non-collegea Collegeb
Data Model Data Model
Average (years) 17.9 18.6 17.2 17.8
Distribution (%):
o 17 years 29.6 21.3 31.6 26.2
½17;19Þ years 18 30.2 41.1 48.2
½19;23Þ years 51.4 48.5 27.3c 25.6c
a Between ages 17 and 40.
b Between ages 20 and 40.
c Between 19 and 21 years of experience.of the mother.16 In order to parametrize the time cost of children, we estimate a ﬁxed effects regression model using our
NLSY79 sample. The dependent variable is weekly hours worked (conditional on being employed) and the explanatory
variables are linear, quadratic and cubic terms on age, the number of children under 18 years of age, and an interaction term
on the age of the mother and the number of children younger than 18. The estimated coefﬁcients for both college and non
college types are shown in Table 7. Based on this regression model, we assume that the time cost per child is a function
τþ jτ1 where j denotes the age of a mother and that the parameter τ¼ 6:81 and τ1 ¼ 0:133 for the case of non college and
τ¼ 12:56 and τ1 ¼ 0:239 for the case of college. Given that on average a non college female has her ﬁrst child at the age of
22.5 and the second child at the age of 26, the assumptions on the time cost of children imply that a mother's working time
is reduced by 3.9 h by the ﬁrst birth and by 3.3 h by the second birth.17
Summarizing: We select the values of 9 parameters for each educational type: 7 parameters describing fertility oppor
tunities θjðnÞ at selected age groups and by the number of children, the preference parameter for children γn, and the
parameter describing the distribution for the value of staying at home with children μvc . As discussed for the case of the16 Table 2 shows that the hours worked by mothers increase with the age of children. We approximate this relation by assuming that the time cost of
children is a decreasing function of the age of the mother. In this way, we reduce the dimensionality of the problem as we do not need to carry as state
variable the age of each child, which computationally could be quite costly with a quarterly model period.
17 Given that in the baseline economy college females have, on average, the ﬁrst and the second child at ages 27.8 and 30.6, the parameterization above
implies an average time cost of ﬁrst and second births of 5.9 h and 5.2 h for college females.
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Fig. 8. Age Proﬁle of wages – non-college males. The lines correspond to the following percentiles of the distribution of wages: 5, 10, 25, 50, 75, 90, and 95.
Relative to the median wage of males at age 20.calibration of males, we proceed by minimizing a loss function constructed by adding the squared deviations between the
statistics in the model with the corresponding target statistics in the data.4.3. Calibration results
We now discuss how the model matches the calibration targets. Fig. 7 reports the employment ratio by age of males for
the model and the data. For both educational types, the model matches well the life cycle path for male employment in the
data. Together with the exogenous hours per worker, the life cycle employment generates a stock of accumulated experi
ence that compares well with the data. At age 40, the model implies 18.6 years for non college and 17.8 years for college of
accumulated experience while the same statistic in the data is 17.9 and 17.2 years respectively. This average experience is
generated from a reasonable distribution of years of experience in the model relative to the data (see Table 8).
The model matches quite closely the life cycle wage growth for the average male in the bottom 50% and in the top 50% of
the wage distribution for each educational type (see Table 15). Moreover, the model also captures reasonably well the
heterogeneity in wage growth by age at different points of the wage distribution for males of each educational type (see
Figs. 8 and 9). The calibration targeted the duration distribution of non employment spells, which the model matches well
(see Table 9).
Regarding the calibration targets for women with children, Table 10 reports the total fertility rate, birth rates by age, and
the distribution of number of children for females at age 40. For both education groups, the model matches the average
fertility rate and the birth rates by age. The model is also consistent with the distribution of women at age 40 by number of
children in the data: About 14% of non college females do not have children, 54% have one or two children, and 32% have
3 or more children. In the case of college women the distribution is as follows: 27% do not have children, 52% have one or
two children, and 21% have 3 or more children.
Table 11 reports the employment to population ratio of females by age of the youngest child in the model compared with
the data. For both education groups, the model matches well the pattern of low employment for females with young
children.
Table 12 documents the duration distribution of child related non employment spells in the model and in the data. The
model does a pretty good job in matching the data along this dimension.14
Fig. 9. Age proﬁle of wages – college males. The lines correspond to the following percentiles of the distribution of wages: 5, 10, 25, 50, 75, 90, and 95.
Relative to the median wage of males at age 20.
Table 9
Duration distribution of non-employment spells – duration weeks (%).
Duration (weeks) Non-college College
Data Model Data Model
1 quarter (7–19) 46 43.6 44 47.3
2 quarters (20–32) 20 20 18 20.7
3 quarters (33–45) 11 12 18 11.4
4 quarters (46–58) 6 7.6 7 10
More than a year (458) 17 16.8 13 13.6
Table 10
Fertility rate, birth rates by age, and distribution of females at age 40 by number of children.
Non-college College
Data Model Data Model
Average fertility 1.95 1.95 1.54 1.55
Birth rates: (%)
17–19 17.5 17.4 2.1 0
20–24 32.5 29.8 11.0 11.5
25–29 28.4 27.9 31.7 32.8
30–34 15.1 15.3 37.3 39.8
35–40 6.5 9.6 17.9 15.9
Female distribution by number of children: (%)
0 14.0 14.1 27.3 26.5
1 18.6 18.9 14.4 16.4
2 35.2 35.8 37.7 38.4
3 20.5 20.2 13.8 12.2
Z 4 11.7 11 6.8 6.5
15
Table 11
Employment ratio of mothers by age of youngest child.
Non-college College
Data Model Data Model
Age of child:
1 quarter 27 30 48.3 45.8
2 quarter 38 38.5 57.8 54.5
3 quarter 42 43 61.6 58.3
4 quarter 44 46 62.4 61
½1;5Þ years 53 60.5 69.0 74.4
½5;6Þ years 63 73.7 75.7 86.6
Table 12
Duration distribution of non-employment spells of mothers (%).
Duration (weeks) Non-collegea Collegeb
Data Model Data Model
1 quarter (7–19 weeks) 16 13 21 19.5
2 quarters (20–32) 8 8 9 10
3 quarters (33–45) 8 6 7 7
4 quarters (46–58) 6 6 5 5.5
More than a year (458) 62 67 58 58
a Between ages 17 and 40.
b Between ages 20 and 40.
Table 13
Duration distribution of non-employment spells (%).
Duration (weeks): Non-collegea Collegeb
Data Model Data Model
1 quarter (7–19) 37.4 40.8 49 44.6
2 quarters (20–32) 16.0 18.6 15 19.6
3 quarters (33–45) 10.3 11.1 12 10.6
4 quarters (46–58) 6.7 7.1 6 6.6
More than a year (458) 29.6 22.4 18 18.6
a Between ages 17 and 40.
b Between ages 20 and 40.5. Quantitative analysis
In this section, we use our theory to measure human capital investment by females. Although we assume that females
face the same human capital technology as males, there are two channels leading to gender differences in the returns to
human capital investment. First, females expect to give birth to children which, in turn, negatively affects females' expected
employment and working hours. Second, females work 10% less hours than males when employed (exogenous hour gap),
regardless of whether they have children or not, as motivated by our discussion of the data in Section 2. As a result, our
theory implies gender differences in human capital investments. The important question is whether our theory quantita
tively accounts for the substantial gender differences the life cycle wage growth documented in the NLSY data. Below, we
argue that the answer to this question is yes.
Female labor supply: As discussed in the calibration section, the model is calibrated to panel data of men and only to data
of women that relates directly to the number of children and to the impact of children on women's employment and hours
of work after childbirth. We emphasize that our calibration does not target the gender differences in labor supply. The model
implies a slightly shorter duration of the non employment spells of non college females relative to the data (see Table 13).
Overall, the model generates large gender differences in labor supply, albeit smaller than in the data for non college. In
effect, by age 40, among non college individuals the gender difference in total hours of work in our model is about 34%,
while this statistic is 46% in the data. In the case of college individuals, the model reproduces the observed gender difference16
Table 14
Average accumulated hours of experience (in years).
Experience Non-collegea Collegeb
Data Model Data Model
Males 20.3 20.8 19.6 19.9
Females 13.9 15.5 15.2 15.3
Males/females 1.46 1.34 1.29 1.30
a Between ages 17 and 40.
b Between ages 20 and 40.
Table 15
Wage growth.
Wage growth Non-collegea Collegeb
Males Females Males Females
Data Model Data Model Data Model Data Model
Average 2.44 2.44 1.95 1.83 2.28 2.28 1.77 1.77
Top 50% 2.85 2.85 2.26 2.15 2.37 2.36 1.88 1.86
Bottom 50% 1.84 1.83 1.48 1.38 2.15 2.15 1.56 1.64
a Ratio age 40/age 17.
b Ratio age 40/age 23.
Table 16
Contribution of children to the increase in the gender wage gap.
Economy Non-collegea Collegeb
Δ Wage gap Contribution Δ Wage gap Contribution
Benchmark 0.25 of children 0.22 of children
Only children 0.14 56% 0.10 45%
Only hours 0.11 56% 0.11 50%
a Between ages 17 and 40.
b Between ages 23 and 40.in labor supply: Between ages 20 and 40 college men accumulate 30% more hours of experience than college women (see
Table 14).
Wages of females in the life cycle: We now present the main ﬁnding of the paper: our quantitative theory of human capital
investments accounts for the low life cycle wage growth of females relative to males. In fact, if anything, we ﬁnd that the
wages of females grow with age slightly less in our model than in the data. While between age 17 and age 40 the wages of
non college females grow by a factor of 1.95 in the data, they grow by a factor of 1.83 in the model. Moreover, the model
matches the fact that wages of college women grow by a factor of 1.77 between ages 23 and 40.
Our theory also has implications for the cross sectional distribution of wages along the life cycle (see Table 15). While
the wage growth of males was a target of our calibration strategy, wage growth for females is the result of their investments
in human capital which are affected by their lower labor supply relative to males. The fact that females have children and
that children reduce their labor supply will have consequences for wage growth which are not calibrated. Table 15 reports
the wage growth at the bottom 50% and at the top 50% of the wage distribution in the model and in the data. Overall, the
table shows that our theory can account well for the slow life cycle wage growth of females across the wage distribution
although the matching of the data is not perfect. In the case of non college, the model understates the life cycle wage
growth of the two groups of females (at the top and at the bottom 50% of the distribution of wages). In the case of college,
the model matches the life cycle wage growth of females at the top 50% while it overstates the wage growth of females at
the bottom 50% of the wage distribution.
The gender gap in wages: In the model economy, the gender differences in wage growth imply an increase in the gender
wage gap of 25 percentage points for non college women (between age 17 and age 40) and of 22 percentage points for
college women (between age 23 and age 40). These statistics are 21 and 22 percentage points in the NLSY data. Hence, the17
Table 17
Race experiment: wage growth of females.a
Data Model
Black non-college 1.77 1.75
All non-college 1.95 1.83
Ratio 0.91 0.94
a Between ages 17 and 40.model accounts well for the increase in the gender wage gap. Our ﬁnding is consistent with that of Bertrand et al. (2010)
who ﬁnd that the large growth in the gender gap for MBAs during their ﬁrst 15 years out is mainly a consequence of gender
differences in career interruptions and weekly hours worked. Moreover, Black et al. (2008) also conclude that human capital
and labor supply factors can account for most of the gender wage gap in a study of U.S. college educated women in the 1993
National Survey of College Graduates (NSCG).18
Recall that in our model there are two channels generating gender differences in labor supply and, hence, in the returns
to human capital investments: children and the exogenous differences in hours of work. In order to evaluate the quanti
tative importance of each of these channels, we consider two experiments. In a ﬁrst experiment, we shut down the exo
genous gender differences in hours of work and assume that the only source of gender differences in labor supply are due to
children. As in the baseline economy, we assume that womenwho give birth draw a stochastic value of staying at home with
their children so that they may go through a non employment spell. Moreover, we assume that children reduce working
hours of employed mothers as in the baseline economy. We refer to this experiment as the “only children” economy. In a
second experiment, we assume that there is an exogenous gender hour gap of 10%, just as in our benchmark economy. To
isolate the role of this channel, we assume that women do not have children. This experiment gives the “only hours”
economy. The results from these experiments are summarized on Table 16.
We ﬁnd that in the “only children” economy the gender wage gap increases over the life cycle by 14 percentage points
for non college females and by 10 percentage points for college females. Comparing with the ﬁndings in the baseline
economy, we conclude that the contribution of children to the increase in the gender wage gap over the life cycle is 56% for
the non college type (14 percentage points out of an increase of 25 percentage points in the baseline economy) and 45% for
the college type (10 percentage points out of an increase of 22 percentage points in the baseline economy). In the “only
hours” economy, we ﬁnd that the gender wage gap increases over the life cycle by 11 percentage points for non college and
by 11 percentage points for college females. Comparing with the ﬁndings in the baseline economy, the results from the
second experiment implies that the contribution of children to the gender wage gap is 56% for the non college type and 50%
for the college type. Altogether, the impact of children on the labor supply of mothers contributes for at least 45% of the
increase in the gender gap in wages over the life cycle. This effect is larger for non college than for college educated females
for two reasons: ﬁrst, non college females have more children and they have children earlier in the life cycle at a time when
the return to human capital investments is higher. Second, the non employment spells related to birth are longer for non
college females than for college females.
5.1. Discussion and relation to the literature
Our ﬁndings are consistent with the vast empirical literature that ﬁnds a substantial gender residual in wage regressions
that measure human capital investments by past experience. To illustrate this point, we simulate non college educated
males and females in our model that are identical in terms of initial human capital and lifetime employment. Our simulated
males and females only differ in lifetime labor supply because females work 10% less hours than males and because females
expect to have children with the associated negative impact on labor supply even though ex post no female is ever given
an opportunity to have children. As a result, we simulate females that are identical to males when they enter the labor
market and have an identical age proﬁle of employment over the life cycle. Since females in this experiment work more
than 35 h a week, we follow the empirical literature in counting them as full time employed. Hence, the data generated by
this experiment features no gender differences in experience as measured by full time employment. Nevertheless, we ﬁnd a
gender wage ratio of 0.875 at age 40: females earn on average a wage that is 12.5 percentage points lower relative to the
average wage of males.19 Using the simulated data, a standard wage regression of log wages on experience (measured as
full time employment) and a sex dummy as explanatory variables would attribute a negative wage effect to being a female18 In their non-parametric study they match individuals on age, highest degree, and major. When they consider women with “high labor market
attachment”, the estimated wage gap almost vanishes (it decreases from values above 0.30 to values in the range of 0.09 to 0.004, depending on the group
of women considered).
19 Note that the previous section we consider an experiment in which non-college women were not allowed to have children and we obtain a gender
wage gap of 11% at age 40. In the current experiment, the gender wage gap is higher because women expect to have children, even though ex-post they do
not have them. Expectations about children reduce human capital investments and lead to an increase in the gender wage gap of 1.5 percentage points.
18
worker and a lower return to (measured) experience by females relative to males. This experiment reveals that even females
that are highly attached to the labor market face weaker incentives to invest in human capital than males that can generate
sizeable gender wage gaps. Young females spend less effort in accumulating human capital than experience equivalent
males because they anticipate working less hours (even if employed full time). We conclude that, in the context of our
model, standard measures of experience typically used in the empirical literature are not good measures of investment in
human capital over the life cycle.
One concern is that our model may overstate the penalty to time off work due to childbirth. Because men's career
interruptions are less frequent, and unrelated to childbirth, they may be more likely to signal a more extreme sort of
heterogeneity. Since our calibration uses data from males to estimate the human capital technology, it is possible that our
model exaggerates the negative impact of career interruptions on female wages. To evaluate this possibility, we use model
simulated data to compare the wage of mothers and non mothers. Following Waldfogel (1998) we compute the average
wage ratio between women with children and women without children at a given age (the “family wage ratio”). We ﬁnd
that the family ratio in wages in our model for females 35 40 years of age is 0.85 which is quite similar to the 0.86 value in
the NLSY data. Hence, our model does not appear to overstate the penalty to time off due to childbirth.
Our theory abstracts from time trends in prices that could have favored relatively more women than men. Bacolod and
Blum (2010) present evidence that in the U.S. economy during the 1968 1990 period the price of cognitive skills has
increased while the price of motor skills has decreased. Moreover, they argue that changes in the price of skills have played
an important role in the reduction of the gender wage gap during recent decades. Had we modeled changes in prices that
favor females relative to males, our theory would have predicted a higher life cycle wage growth of females and a lower
gender wage gap. The effects of children on human capital accumulation would not have diminished as long as the cali
bration would have kept constant the targets for fertility and the impact of children on labor supply. Hence, the contribution
of children to the overall gender wage gap would have been larger.
Our results do not rule out the possibility of labor market discrimination. In fact, the exogenous gender differences in
labor supply that we assumed could (partly) be due to labor market discrimination. While our theory focuses on the role of
children as an “impulse” and on the interaction of labor supply and human capital over the life cycle as a propagation
mechanism, labor market discrimination can be thought of as alternative (or complementary) impulse. We focus on the
impact of children for labor supply and wages because children are measurable and have a ﬁrst order impact on the labor
supply of women. Adding labor market discrimination to our model would not reduce the quantitative importance of
children in our theory. Obviously, discrimination alone could not account for the facts on the gender wage gap since dis
crimination would need to be coupled with our human capital mechanism for the theory to be capable of generating the
increase in the gender wage gap over the life cycle. Whether discrimination plays an important role in generating gender
differences in labor supply or not, a key message of our paper is that human capital and labor supply factors can account for
the overall increase of the gender wage gap in the life cycle.
5.2. Race and the gender wage gap
While in the U.S. black women tend to have more children than white women, the gender wage gap is lower among
blacks than among non blacks. At ﬁrst glance, this observation seems inconsistent with the predictions of our theory.
Nonetheless, we now show that the theory is consistent with data on gender differences in wage growth across races. We
use NLSY data (with the oversample of blacks) to document some facts on gender differences in labor supply and wages
among black individuals. Due to small sample sizes, the analysis is restricted to individuals with non college education.20
The main ﬁndings are:
 FACT 1: Black non college women tend to have more children and to give birth at younger ages than the average non
college woman. The total fertility rate of non college black women is 2.28 while it is 1.95 for non college women
(including all races). The timing of births also differs across black and the average non college woman. About 30% of
births occur before age 20 for black non college women while such percentage is 18% for all non college women.
 FACT 2: The labor supply of black non college women is lower than the labor supply of the average non college women.
The accumulated experience at age 40 (in hours) is 13 years for black non college women while it is 14.5 years for the
average non college woman.
 FACT 3: The gender wage gap at age 40 is lower among non college black than among the average non college
population. While at age 17 the gender wage gap is small and does not vary across races, the gender wage gap at age 40 is
15 percentage points among black non college while it is 23 percentage points among all non college individuals.
The ﬁrst two facts point that black women tend to have more children (at young ages) and to work less than the average
non college women, which is consistent with the view that children negatively affect the labor supply of females. Hence, our
theory implies that black females should face lower incentives to accumulate human capital than the average non college20 We compute all the statistics documented in Section 2 only for non-college black men and women since we have few observations for college
educated black individuals.
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female in the U.S. economy. It is thus surprising that the gender differences in wage growth in the U.S. are smaller for blacks
than for non blacks individuals (Fact 3). We now document two more facts that help reconcile the predictions of the theory
with the U.S. data.
 FACT 4: Gender differences in labor supply are lower for non college black individuals than for all non college people. The
ratio of experience (measured by adding up lifetime hours of work) at age 40 of men relative to women is 1.32 for black
non college individuals and 1.45 for all non college individuals.
 FACT 5: Life cycle wage growth is lower for black non college women than for the average non college women. Between
age 17 and age 40 wages grow by a factor of 1.77 for black non college women and by a factor of 1.95 for all non
college women.
Fact 5 shows that black non college women face lower wage growth than the average non college woman. Despite the
low wage growth of black non college women, by age 40 the gender wage gap among black non college individuals is
smaller than that of the overall non college population (Fact 3). The low gender wage gap among black individuals is
explained by the fact that black males work very little and accumulate little human capital relative to other males in the U.S.
economy (Fact 4).21 Thus, the low gender wage gap among black non college individuals does not contradict our view that
children have a negative impact on female wage growth. In fact, consistently with our theory, the data reveals that black
women work less (Fact 2) and accumulate less human capital (Fact 5) than the average non college woman in the economy.
Our theory points that black females face low returns to human capital accumulation because they expect to have more
children and, hence, to work less than other non college females in the economy.
We now evaluate the quantitative predictions of the theory. We ask: Can racial differences in fertility behavior account
for the low wage growth faced by black non college women relative to the average non college woman in the U.S. economy?
To answer this question, we use our model to perform a counter factual experiment. This experiment consists in changing
the fertility behavior of non college women in the baseline model in order to match the fertility rates by age of black non
college women in the U.S. data. This is done by recalibrating the parameters determining fertility opportunities. We also
recalibrate the parameter determining the mean of the distribution of the value of staying at home with children in order to
match the employment rate of black mothers by the age of the youngest child.22 All the other parameters of the baseline
economy are kept constant. As shown in the Appendix, the re calibrated model ﬁts well the targeted employment rate of
mothers and the fertility statistics of black non college women (see Tables 20 and 21).
The main ﬁnding of this experiment is that the average wage growth from age 17 to age 40 decreases from a factor of 1.83
to a factor of 1.75 when non college women exhibit the fertility behavior of black non college women (see Table 17). This
reduction accounts for 44% of the difference in life cycle wage growth between black non college women and the average
non college women in the NLSY data. We conclude that fertility decisions play an important role in understanding the low
wage growth faced by black non college women in the U.S. economy.6. Conclusions
This paper measures how much of the gender wage gap over the life cycle is due to the fact that working hours are lower
for women than for men. Building detailed labor market histories of men and women from NLSY79 data, we document large
differences in labor supply: by age 40 the gender differences in cumulative hours of work are 45% among non college and
27% among college individuals. We build a quantitative theory of fertility, labor supply, and human capital accumulation
decisions to measure gender differences in human capital investments over the life cycle. The human capital technology is
calibrated using wage age proﬁles of men. While women are assumed to be identical to males in terms of the human capital
technology, we assumed that the bearing and presence of children involves a forced reduction in hours of work that falls on
females rather than on males and that there is an exogenous gender gap in hours of work. The model is calibrated to the
fertility patterns and the impact of children on female labor hours in the data. The calibrated model economy is used to
measure human capital investments of females during the life cycle. We ﬁnd that our theory accounts for all of the increase
in the gender wage gap over the life cycle in the NLSY data. The impact of children on the labor supply of females accounts
for 56% and 45% of the increase in the gender wage gap among non college and college females, whereas the remaining part
is due to the assumed exogenous gender differences in labor supply.
We use data on black non college individuals from the NLSY with the oversample of blacks to test the predictions of
the theory. Consistently with our theory, the data reveals that black non college women give birth to more children, work
less hours, and accumulate less human capital than the average non college women in the population. In a quantitative
experiment we ﬁnd that racial differences in fertility behavior account for 44% of the differences in life cycle wage growth
between black non college women and the average non college women in the NLSY data.21 The question of why black males work few hours in the labor market is important but out of the scope of the current paper.
22 The values of the recalibrated parameters are reported in Table 19 in the Appendix.
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In future work, it would be important to investigate how differences in occupational choices matter for gender differ
ences in hours of work and human capital accumulation. It will also be interesting to use an extended version of our
framework to study how various factors affecting female labor supply over time impact on the gender wage gap. To deepen
our understanding of the family and welfare, the model could be enhanced to incorporate a non linear utility function on
consumption together with savings and marriage decisions. These interesting but non trivial extensions are left for future
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Parameter values.
Non-college College
Parameter Value Parameter Value Parameter Value Parameter Value
v17 8.0 Δ 3% v20 35.10 Δ 4.15%
v20 1.12 α1 0.351 v21 5.0 α1 0.31
v25 0.42 α2 0.379 v23 0.35 α2 0.457
v30 0.29 θ17 21ð0Þ 0.0269 v25 0.38 θ20 24ð0Þ 0.0082
v40 0.25 θ22 26ð0Þ 0.0265 v30 0.07 θ25 29ð0Þ 0.0210
v50 0.24 θ27 31ð0Þ 0.0265 v40 0.05 θ30 34ð0Þ 0.0259
v55 0.25 θ32 40ð0Þ 0.0090 v50 0.05 θ35 40ð0Þ 0.0086
v60 0.34 θjð1Þ θjð0Þ1:44 v60 0.20 θjð1Þ θjð0Þ2:66
v65 1.6 θjð2Þ θjð0Þ0:76 v65 0.86 θjð2Þ θjð0Þ0:76
ρ 0.76 θjð3þÞ θjð0Þ0:76 ρ 0.76 θjð3þÞ θjð0Þ1:27
σϵ 0.79 μvc 0.7 σϵ 1.345 μvc 4.1
σh17 0.233 γn 1.0 σh20 0.395 γn 1.0
γh 0.728 γh 0.976
Table 19
Race experiment: parameter values.
Parameter Value
θ17 21ð0Þ 0.0415
θ22 26ð0Þ 0.0260
θ27 31ð0Þ 0.0237
θ32 40ð0Þ 0.0044
θjð1Þ θjð0Þ1:62
θjð2Þ θjð0Þ1:167
θjð3þÞ θjð0Þ1:06
μvc 0.65
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Table 20
Race experiment: employment ratio of mothers by age of youngest child.
Age of child: Data Model
1 quarter 24 25
2 quarter 34 33
3 quarter 38 37
4 quarter 40 40
½1;5Þ years 49 56
½5;6Þ years 60 74
Table 21
Race experiment: fertility rate, birth rates by age, and distribution of females at age 40 by number of children.
Data Model
Average fertility 2.28 2.28
Birth rates by age: (%)
17–19 27 24
20–24 32.4 34
25–29 22.5 24
30–34 12.6 11
35–40 5.5 6.6
Female distribution by number of children: (%)
0 12 13
1 15 14
2 31 27
3 23 24
Z 4 19 22Appendix B. Supplementary data
Supplementary data associated with this paper can be found in the online version at http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.euro
ecorev.2015.12.014.References
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